David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109 (2009)
Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.
|Keywords||intuition a priori methodology inclination to believe evidence|
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Silva Jr (2013). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Awareness of Abstract Objects. Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Bernard Molyneux (2014). New Arguments That Philosophers Don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):441-461.
Preston J. Werner (2013). Seemings: Still Dispositions to Believe. Synthese 191 (8):1-14.
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