Intuitions are inclinations to believe

Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109 (2009)
Abstract
Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.
Keywords intuition  a priori  methodology  inclination to believe  evidence
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:99-138.

    View all 16 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-02-03

    Total downloads

    470 ( #214 of 1,089,057 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    69 ( #523 of 1,089,057 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.