An 'evidentialist' worry about Joyce's argument for Probabilism

Dialetica 66 (3):425-433 (2012)
To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear whether the DBA pinpoints any epistemic defect of incoherent agents. The same can be said for Representation Theorem arguments, since they involve the structure of an agent’s preferences
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01311.x
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References found in this work BETA
Niko Kolodny (2007). How Does Coherence Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
David Lewis (1980). A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press 83--132.
A. Hajek (2008). Arguments for-or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.

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Alan Hájek (2008). Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793 - 819.
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Stuart Rachels (2002). Nagelian Arguments Against Egoism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):191 – 208.

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