David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332 (2011)
In the first paper, I discussed the basic claims of Bayesianism (that degrees of belief are important, that they obey the axioms of probability theory, and that they are rationally updated by either standard or Jeffrey conditionalization) and the arguments that are often used to support them. In this paper, I will discuss some applications these ideas have had in confirmation theory, epistemol- ogy, and statistics, and criticisms of these applications.
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kenny Easwaran (2015). Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities. Noûs 50 (3).
Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2013). Normative Theories of Argumentation: Are Some Norms Better Than Others? Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
Matthew Parrott (2014). Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):axu036.
Matthew Parrott (2016). Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):271-296.
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