Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms

Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332 (2011)
In the first paper, I discussed the basic claims of Bayesianism (that degrees of belief are important, that they obey the axioms of probability theory, and that they are rationally updated by either standard or Jeffrey conditionalization) and the arguments that are often used to support them. In this paper, I will discuss some applications these ideas have had in confirmation theory, epistemol- ogy, and statistics, and criticisms of these applications.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,230
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1945). The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5 (4):513-532.
David Christensen (1999). Measuring Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.

View all 29 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
F. P. A. Coolen (2006). On Nonparametric Predictive Inference and Objective Bayesianism. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):21-47.
Brian Weatherson (2003). From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
Kenny Easwaran (2010). Logic and Probability. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (2):229-253.
Jon Williamson & David Corfield (2001). Introduction: Bayesianism Into the 21st Century. In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers 1--16.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

182 ( #5,975 of 1,699,642 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

135 ( #551 of 1,699,642 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.