David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320 (2011)
Bayesianism is a collection of positions in several related fields, centered on the interpretation of probability as something like degree of belief, as contrasted with relative frequency, or objective chance. However, Bayesianism is far from a unified movement. Bayesians are divided about the nature of the probability functions they discuss; about the normative force of this probability function for ordinary and scientific reasoning and decision making; and about what relation (if any) holds between Bayesian and non-Bayesian concepts
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Citations of this work BETA
Kenny Easwaran (2015). Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities. Noûs 49 (3).
Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Marcello Di Bello (2014). Epistemic Closure, Assumptions and Topics of Inquiry. Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.
Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2013). Normative Theories of Argumentation: Are Some Norms Better Than Others? Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
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