Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor

Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320 (2011)
Abstract
Bayesianism is a collection of positions in several related fields, centered on the interpretation of probability as something like degree of belief, as contrasted with relative frequency, or objective chance. However, Bayesianism is far from a unified movement. Bayesians are divided about the nature of the probability functions they discuss; about the normative force of this probability function for ordinary and scientific reasoning and decision making; and about what relation (if any) holds between Bayesian and non-Bayesian concepts
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00399.x
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Christopher J. G. Meacham (2016). Understanding Conditionalization. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):767-797.

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