|Abstract||Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent’s credences. They point out that real numbers can’t capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events, and actually impossible ones — both get credence 0, which violates a principle known as “regularity”. Following Lewis  and Skyrms , they recommend that we should instead use a much richer set of numbers, called the “hyperreals”. I think that this popular view is the result of two mistakes. The first, which I call the “numerical fallacy”, is to assume that all there is to a mathematical representation is the numbers. In this case, I claim that the standard mathematical representation already captures the needed distinctions, if we look beyond the numbers. The second mistake is like that made by the cartographers in Borges’ story. A representation is no good if it is too large to use. As I show at the end of this paper, the hyperreals have exactly this problem — they are too rich a structure to fit in the world, even if they could help us restore regularity.|
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