Strong and weak expectations

Mind 117 (467):633-641 (2008)
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Abstract

Fine has shown that assigning any value to the Pasadena game is consistent with a certain standard set of axioms for decision theory. However, I suggest that it might be reasonable to believe that the value of an individual game is constrained by the long-run payout of repeated plays of the game. Although there is no value that repeated plays of the Pasadena game converges to in the standard strong sense, I show that there is a weaker sort of convergence it exhibits, and use this to define a notion of ‘weak expectation’ that can give values to the Pasadena game and many others, though not to all games that fail to have a strong expectation in the standard sense. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?

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Author's Profile

Kenny Easwaran
University of California, Irvine

References found in this work

Vexing expectations.Harris Nover & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):237-249.
No expectations.Mark Colyvan - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):695-702.

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