David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 120 (478):193-237 (2011)
According to the standard story (a) W. V. Quine’s criticisms of the idea that logic is true by convention are directed against, and completely undermine, Rudolf Carnap’s idea that the logical truths of a language L are the sentences of L that are true-in- L solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for L , and (b) Quine himself had no interest in or use for any notion of truth by convention. This paper argues that (a) and (b) are both false. Carnap did not endorse any truth-by-convention theses that are undermined by Quine’s technical observations. Quine knew this. Quine’s criticisms of the thesis that logic is true by convention are not directed against a truth-by-convention thesis that Carnap actually held, but are part of Quine’s own project of articulating the consequences of his scientific naturalism. Quine found that logic is not true by convention in any naturalistically acceptable sense. But he also observed that in set theory and other highly abstract parts of science we sometimes deliberately adopt postulates with no justification other than that they are elegant and convenient. For Quine such postulations constitute a naturalistically acceptable and fallible sort of truth by convention. It is only when an act of adopting a postulate is not indispensible to natural science that Quine sees it as affording truth by convention ‘unalloyed’. A naturalist who accepts Quine’s notion of truth by convention is therefore not limited (as naturalists are often thought to be) to accepting only those postulates that she regards as indispensible to natural science
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References found in this work BETA
Alexander George (2000). On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It: Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity. Mind 109 (433):1-24.
G. Rosen (1999). Review. Naturalism in Mathematics. Penelope Maddy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):467-474.
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Alex George (2000). On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It. Mind 109 (433):1--24.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Warren (2015). The Possibility of Truth by Convention. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):84-93.
Albert Casullo (2013). Four Challenges to the a Priori—a Posteriori Distinction. Synthese 192 (9):1-24.
Paul Dicken (2013). Tolerance and Voluntarism. Philosophical Papers 42 (1):25 - 48.
Gary Ebbs (2014). Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.
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