Analysis 65 (287):237-244 (2005)
In two previous papers I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support skepticism about self-knowledge is actually self-undermining, in the sense that no one can justifiably accept all of its premises at once. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premises of my explanation are true, the skeptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the skeptical argument is self-undermining, it can still serve as a _reductio ad absurdum
|Keywords||Epistemology Incoherence Scepticism Self-knowledge Brueckner, Anthony|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ernest Sosa (2009). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. OUP Oxford.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Transmission for Knowledge Not Established. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):193-195.
Anthony Brueckner (2008). Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):733–736.
Anthony Brueckner (1999). Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Analysis 59 (1):59–62.
Anthony Brueckner (2007). Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Redux. Analysis 67 (296):311–315.
Gary Ebbs (2001). Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.
Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):109-114.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.
Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #55,665 of 722,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?