David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (4):379 – 394 (2005)
In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, in vitro fertilization, and embryonic stem cell research, one primary concern regards establishing when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a person. Thomas Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human person until its body is informed by a rational soul. Aquinas's explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence upon medieval biological data, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas's basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human person's beginning. In this article, I discuss two recent interpretations in which it is argued that a human person does not begin to exist until a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jason T. Eberl (2007). A Thomistic Perspective on the Beginning of Personhood: Redux. Bioethics 21 (5):283–289.
J. T. Eberl & R. A. Ballard (2009). Metaphysical and Ethical Perspectives on Creating Animal-Human Chimeras. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (5):470-486.
Jason Eberl (2009). The Complex Nature of Jewish and Catholic Bioethics. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (11):31-32.
Similar books and articles
A. -K. M. Andersson (2011). Embryonic Stem Cells and Property Rights. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (3):221-242.
Kevin W. Sharpe (2005). Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
Gyula Klima (2009). Aquinas on the Materiality of the Human Soul and the Immateriality of the Human Intellect. Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):163-182.
Robert Pasnau (2002). Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a, 75-89. Cambridge University Press.
Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (2005). Psychology and Mind in Aquinas. History of Psychiatry 16 (3):291-310.
Gerald Gleeson (2004). Speaking of Persons, Human and Divine. Sophia 43 (1):45-60.
Christina Van Dyke (2009). Not Properly a Person. Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):186-204.
John Haldane & Patrick Lee (2003). Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life. Philosophy 78 (2):255-278.
Jason T. Eberl (2010). Varieties of Dualism. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):39-56.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #61,309 of 1,099,918 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #51,477 of 1,099,918 )
How can I increase my downloads?