Hempel and Oppenheim on explanation

Philosophy of Science 28 (4):418-428 (1961)
Abstract
Hempel and Oppenheim, in their paper 'The Logic of Explanation', have offered an analysis of the notion of scientific explanation. The present paper advances considerations in the light of which their analysis seems inadequate. In particular, several theorems are proved with roughly the following content: between almost any theory and almost any singular sentence, certain relations of explainability hold
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Citations of this work BETA
C. A. Hooker (1980). Explanation, Generality and Understanding. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):284 – 290.
Ren-Zong Qiu (1989). Models of Explanation and Explanation in Medicine. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (2):199 – 212.
Charles G. Morgan (1976). Tuomela on Deductive Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4):511 - 525.
Peter Clark (1990). Explanation in Physics: Explanation in Physical Theory. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:155-175.
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