Zur Formulierung prädikativer Aussagen in den logischen Schriften des Aristoteles

Phronesis 22 (2):123 - 145 (1977)
Why does Aristotle not use the copulative wording for categorical propositions, but instead the clumsier terminological formulations (e. g. the B belongs to every A) in his syllogistic? The proposed explanations by Alexander, Lukasiewicz and Patzig: Aristotle wants to make clear the difference between subject and predicate, seems to be insufficient. In quantified categorical propositions, this difference is always sufficiently clear by the use of the pronouns going with the subject expressions. Aristotle opts for the terminological wording because in premiss pairs of figures two and three he can thus suppress the middle term in one of the premisses and connect the major and minor term, using connecting particles. This renders the syllogisms more transparent. Had he used the copulative wording instead, he would have run into difficulties, in particular with o-propositions among the premisses (i. e. in Baroco and Bocardo) because in these cases the pronoun expressing the quantification would have to go with the subject term, the negation with the predicate.
Keywords Aristotle, syllogistic, wording of categorical propositions
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