McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism

European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386 (2011)
Abstract
Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could be plausible only from an externalist point of view that is in tension with the view of normativity that motivates conceptualism; 3) the identity conception of truth is incompatible with McDowell's recent version of conceptualism in terms of ‘non-propositional intuitive contents’
Keywords Conceptualism  Identity conception of truth  External world skepticism  Non-conceptual content
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Brandom (1998). Perception and Rational Constraint. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):369-374.
Robert Brandom (1998). Review: Perception and Rational Constraint. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):369 - 374.
Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.

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