David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197 (2009)
John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity’s having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle’s employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell’s structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle’s problem with computational cognitive science, and refutes it by suggesting how our understanding of computation is far from implying the structuralism Searle vitally attributes to it. On the way, I formulate and argue for a thesis that strengthens Newman’s case against Russell’s structuralism, and thus raises the apparent risk for computational cognitive science too.
|Keywords||Computation Truth Structuralism Searle Russell Multiple realizability Strong AI|
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References found in this work BETA
David J. Chalmers (1996). Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton? Synthese 108 (3):309-33.
Bertrand Russell (1927). The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul.
William Demopoulos & Michael Friedman (1985). Bertrand Russell's the Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest. Philosophy of Science 52 (4):621-639.
John Bickle, Multiple Realizability. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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