Some Remarks on Laudan's Theory of Scientific Rationality

Abstract
When is it rational to pursue a research tradition? In Progress and Its Problems, Laudan suggests that if a research tradition RT has a higher rate of progress than any of its rivals, where the rate of progress of an RT is the problem solving effectiveness of its theories over time, then it is rational to pursue RT. In this paper I offer a number of criticisms of this suggestion, with special attention to the current controversy over the rational pursuability of cognitive science
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David Pearce (1984). Research Traditions, Incommensurability and Scientific Progress. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 15 (2):261-271.
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