Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance

Philosophical Studies 136 (3):385 - 404 (2007)
Resemblances obtain not only between objects but between properties. Resemblances of the latter sort - in particular resemblances between quantitative properties - prove to be the downfall of a well-known theory of universals, namely the one presented by David Armstrong. This paper examines Armstrong's efforts to account for such resemblances within the framework of his theory and also explores several extensions of that theory. All of them fail.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/40208805
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1986). Against Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.

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Citations of this work BETA
Maya Eddon (2013). Quantitative Properties. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):633-645.

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