Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality

Abstract
The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties
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    References found in this work BETA
    Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
    John Hawthorne (2001). Intrinsic Properties and Natural Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):399-403.

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