Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality

The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00414.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Nolan (2014). Hyperintensional Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 171 (1):149-160.
Dan Marshall (2013). Intrinsicality and Grounding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-19.

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