Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):605-619 (2010)
|Abstract||The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism. However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version of the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics gives us a compelling reason to favor one theory of persistence over another|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Theodore Sider (2000). The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 60 (1):84–88.
Sally Haslanger (1989). Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
Pablo Rychter (2011). How Coincidence Bears on Persistence. Philosophia 39 (4):759-770.
Jeffrey E. Brower (2011). Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Mind 119 (476):883-905.
Ryan Wasserman, Recombination, Causal Constraints and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?
Lawrence B. Lombard (2006). Scope Fallacies and the “Decisive Objection” Against Endurance. Philosophia 34 (4):441-452.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2010). Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
R. Wasserman (2003). The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419.
Bradley Rettler (2012). McTaggart and Indexing the Copula. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):431-434.
Added to index2010-08-06
Total downloads65 ( #14,306 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,010 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?