Graduate studies at Western
History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):68-78 (2013)
|Abstract||In the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in a re-evaluation of Frege's stance towards consistency- and independence proofs. Papers by several authors deal with Frege's views on these topics. In this note, I want to discuss one particular problem, which seems to be a main reason for Frege's reluctant attitude towards his own proposed method of proving the independence of axioms, namely his view that thoughts, that is, intensional entities are the objects of metatheoretical investigations. This stands in contrast to more straightforward interpretations, which claim that Frege's hesitancy is mainly due to worries concerning the logical constants or what counts as a logical inference|
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