Remarks on Independence Proofs and Indirect Reference

History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):68-78 (2013)
In the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in a re-evaluation of Frege’s stance towards consistency- and independence proofs. Papers by several authors deal with Frege’s views on these topics. In this note, I want to discuss one particular problem, which seems to be a main reason for Frege’s reluctant attitude towards his own proposed method of proving the independence of axioms, namely his view that thoughts, that is, intensional entities are the objects of metatheoretical investigations. This stands in contrast to more straightforward interpretations, which claim that Frege’s hesitancy is mainly due to worries concerning the logical constants or what counts as a logical inference
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DOI 10.1080/01445340.2012.702568
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G. Aldo Antonelli & Robert C. May (2000). Frege's New Science. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):242-270.

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G. Aldo Antonelli & Robert C. May (2000). Frege's New Science. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):242-270.
Ivan Welty (2011). Frege on Indirect Proof. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):283-290.
Sanford Shieh (2008). Frege on Definitions. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):992-1012.
Richard Heck (2007). Frege and Semantics. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.

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