Mellor on chance and causation [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):411-433 (1997)
Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to the standard calculus has wider application than the causal instances to which Mellor's notion is restricted (Section 8). Other topics discussed may be gleaned from the headings below. 1 Review of D.H. Mellor : The Facss of Causation, London, Routledge, International Library of Philosophy.
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Citations of this work BETA
Luke Glynn (2011). A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-392.
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