Possible knowledge of unknown truth

Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52 (2010)
Abstract
Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.
Keywords Fitch  Unknowability  Counterfactuals  Williamson
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References found in this work BETA
W. D. Hart & Colin McGinn (1976). Knowledge and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):205 - 208.

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