David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52 (2010)
Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.
|Keywords||Fitch Unknowability Counterfactuals Williamson|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Robert Stalnaker (1999). Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Routledge & K. Paul.
Citations of this work BETA
Alessandro Giordani (2015). On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox. Erkenntnis 81 (3):597-611.
Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu (2013). Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis. Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
Eleonora Cresto (forthcoming). Lost in Translation: Unknowable Propositions in Probabilistic Frameworks. Synthese:1-23.
André Fuhrmann (2014). Knowability as Potential Knowledge. Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.
Carlo Proietti (2016). The Fitch-Church Paradox and First Order Modal Logic. Erkenntnis 81 (1):87-104.
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Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
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