Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore the moral status of sport through a conceptual structure borrowed from Jürgen Habermas's philosophy and social theory. Habermas distinguishes between communicative and strategic action as two ways in which social action may be coordinated. While the former relies on the building of mutual understanding between social agents, the latter entails one agent manipulating others, as if they were mere objects to be treated instrumentally. In an initial model of sporting practice, it is suggested that sport primarily involves strategic action and in particular encourages the undermining of one's opponent's autonomy. This model is subject to criticism, by scrutinising Habermas's interpretation of the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game, and thus the relationship between communicative language-use and strategic games playing. It will be suggested that games playing has more in common with language-use than Habermas acknowledges, thereby opening up a space for genuinely communicative and expressive action within sport. In conclusion, it will be suggested that the moral significance of sport lies in the fact that its communicative and expressive potential can only be exercised against the moral threat of the dominance of strategic action