Graduate studies at Western
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):1–22 (2004)
|Abstract||I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.|
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