Achieving consensus among agents - an opinion-dynamics model
| Abstract | The paper considers the problem of how a distributed system of agents (who communicate only via a localised network) might achieve consensus by copying beliefs (copy) from each other and doing some belief pruning themselves (drop). This is explored using a social simulation model, where beliefs interact with each other via a compatibility function, which assigns a level of compatibility (which is a sort of weak consistency) to a set of beliefs. The probability of copy and drop processes occurring is based on the increase in compatibility this process might result in. This allows for a process of collective consensus building whilst allowing for temporarily incompatible beliefs to be held by an agent. | |||||||||
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Stuart C. Shapiro & William J. Rapaport (1991). Models and Minds. In Robert E. Cummins & John L. Pollock (eds.), Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hans Van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.
Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2).
Igor Douven & Alexander Riegler (2009). Extending the Hegselmann–Krause Model III: From Single Beliefs to Complex Belief States. Episteme 6 (2):145-163.
Aviezer Tucker (2003). The Epistemic Significance of Consensus. Inquiry 46 (4):501 – 521.
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