Simplicity is not truth-indicative
| Abstract | In this paper I will argue that, in general, where the evidence supports two theories equally, the simpler theory is not more likely to be true and is not likely to be nearer the truth. In other words simplicity does not tell us anything about model bias. Our preference for simpler theories (apart from their obvious pragmatic advantages) can be explained by the facts that humans are known to elaborate unsuccessful theories rather than attempt a thorough revision and that a fixed set of data can only justify adjusting a certain number of parameters to a limited degree of precision. No extra tendency towards simplicity in the natural world is necessary to explain our preference for simpler theories. Thus Occam's razor eliminates itself (when interpreted in this form). | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesSamuel A. Richmond (1996). A Simplification of the Theory of Simplicity. Synthese 107 (3):373 - 393.
James W. McAllister (1991). The Simplicity of Theories: Its Degree and Form. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (1):1-14.
Nicholas Maxwell, Simplicity. PhilSci Archive.
Roger White (2005). Why Favour Simplicity? Analysis 65 (287):205–210.
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