David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120 (1996)
Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, it is then argued that when this revised concept of superassertibility is taken as the truth predicate of probability statements, statements whose test procedures are paradigmatically not sure fire, then any anti-realist theory of the sense of such probability statements cannot be compositional, in Dummett's sense of compositional.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1983). Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press.
Neil Tennant (1987). Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Wolfram Hinzen (2000). Anti-Realist Semantics. Erkenntnis 52 (3):281-311.
Deborah C. Smith (2007). Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright's Antirealist. Synthese 157 (1):129 - 139.
María Ponte Azcárate (2007). A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.
Janet Folina (1995). Putnam, Realism and Truth. Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Christian Miller (2007). The Conditions of Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:95-132.
J. Salerno (2000). Revising the Logic of Logical Revision. Philosophical Studies 99 (2):211-227.
Dorit Bar-On (1996). Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge. Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166.
William Child (2007). Dreaming, Calculating, Thinking: Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism About the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):252–272.
Paul Tomassi (2006). Truth, Warrant and Superassertibility. Synthese 148 (1):31 - 56.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #97,829 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?