Are the judgments of conscience unreasonable?

This paper examines the tensions in classical liberal theory ? particularly that of Locke and Kant ? between reason and conscience, and in contemporary liberal theory between the demands of reasonableness and the dictates of conscience. We intend to show that the relationship between reasonableness and conscience is both unstable and necessary; on occasions there seems to exist a moral obligation to provide public reasons for our conduct and at other times the silent call of conscience precludes public justification of conscientious objection or dissent.
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DOI 10.1080/13698230802021389
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John Rawls (1999). Collected Papers. Harvard University Press.

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