How to solve the problem of mixed conjunctions
Analysis 68 (298):143–149 (2008)
| Abstract | The problem of mixed conjunctions, due to Tappolet (2000), threatens to undermine alethic pluralism by showing that it cannot account for the truth of conjunctions in which the conjuncts spring from different domains of discourse. In this paper I argue, firstly, that the problem is not just a problem for alethic pluralism and, secondly, that the problem can be solved. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Truth Pluralism | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesCory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Douglas Edwards (2012). On Alethic Disjunctivism. Dialectica 66 (1):200-214.
Douglas Edwards (2009). Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
Christine Tappolet (1997). Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Analysis 57 (3):209–210.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Varieties of Alethic Pluralism (and Why Alethic Disjunctivism is Relatively Compelling)∗. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (2013). Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
Christine Tappolet (2000). Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logics: A Reply to Beall. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):382-385.
Timothy J. Nulty (2010). The Metaphysics of Mixed Inferences: Problems with Functionalist Accounts of Alethic Pluralism. Metaphysica 11 (2):153-162.
Roy T. Cook (2011). Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):624-629.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads14 ( #84,198 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
