Graduate studies at Western
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):169-90 (1999)
|Abstract||An attractive semantic theory presented by Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow takes a report of propositional attitudes, e.g 'Tom believes Judy Garland sang', to report a believing relation between Tom and an interpreted logical form constructed from 'Judy Garland sang'. We briefly outline the semantic theory and indicate its attractions. However, the definition of interpreted logical forms given by Larson and Ludlow is shown to be faulty, and an alternative definition is offered which matches their intentions. This definition is then shown to imply that Tom does not know his own mind, a result without intuitive support. A third definition is offered to deal with this problem|
|Keywords||Epistemology Interpretation Knowledge Logical Form Mind|
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