Likelihood
Cambridge [Eng.]University Press (1972)
| Abstract | Dr Edwards' stimulating and provocative book advances the thesis that the appropriate axiomatic basis for inductive inference is not that of probability, with its addition axiom, but rather likelihood - the concept introduced by Fisher as a measure of relative support amongst different hypotheses. Starting from the simplest considerations and assuming no more than a modest acquaintance with probability theory, the author sets out to reconstruct nothing less than a consistent theory of statistical inference in science. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Science Statistical methods Probabilities Mathematical statistics | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $12.99 used $20.14 new (29% off) $25.08 direct from Amazon (11% off) Amazon page | |||||||||
| Call number | Q175.E34 | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 0801844436 0521082994 | |||||||||
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Andrew Backe (1999). The Likelihood Principle and the Reliability of Experiments. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):361.
Wesley C. Salmon (1971). Statistical Explanation & Statistical Relevance. [Pittsburgh]University of Pittsburgh Press.
Elliott Sober (1988). Likelihood and Convergence. Philosophy of Science 55 (2):228-237.
Hugues Leblanc (1962/2006). Statistical and Inductive Probabilities. Dover Publications.
Deborah G. Mayo (1980). The Philosophical Relevance of Statistics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:97 - 109.
Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1959). Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd.
Andrés Rivadulla (1991). Mathematical Statistics and Metastatistical Analysis. Erkenntnis 34 (2):211 - 236.
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