Nagel on Concievability

Abstracta 5 (1):16-29 (2009)
Abstract
In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel aims to identify a form of idealism, to isolate the argument for it and to counter this argument. The position that Nagel takes to be idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. In this paper, I show that Nagel has not made a convincing case against this position. I then present an alternative case. In light of this alternative case, we have reason to reject an important example that Nagel offers of a contemporary idealist, namely Donald Davidson.
Keywords Thomas Nagel
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