David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1-18 (2002)
After a contrast of the the prima facie complexity of the causality of the rational agent with the received scientific doctrine of causality, it is noticed that the prima facie causal authority of rational action belongs to a macroscopic domain in which all science and philosophy takes place and in which the formal/telic nature of that causality must be taken for granted. Any philosophical justification or philosophical criticism of the status of that macroscopic arena must therefore take place within that same arena. It is then argued that a justification of the ontological status of that arena is possible by an exploitation of the reflexive resource of the rational awareness we exercise within that arena. It is claimed that this resource can be fairly described as the justification of our direct knowing of real beings/entities other than the knower and that such realistic knowing is at the same time an exemplary mode of causality having a complexity that is both formal/telic and hierarchical . In short, the rational agent is also a direct knower, and direct knowing requires a sense of "cause' more complex than the received scientific doctrine of causality provides. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
|Keywords||rational action complexity causality philosophy ontology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Tina Grotzer (2012). Learning Causality in a Complex World: Understandings of Consequence. Rowman & Littlefield Education.
Gero Schwenk (2006). Interlevel Relations and Manipulative Causality. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37 (1):99 - 110.
E. J. Lowe (2003). Rational Action, Freedom, and Choice. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2:http://www.iscid.org/papers/Lowe.
Tore Sandven (1995). Intentional Action and Pure Causality: A Critical Discussion of Some Central Conceptual Distinctions in the Work of Jon Elster. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (3):286-317.
Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (1981). Free Agency: A Non-Reductionist Causal Account. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:113-132.
Amy Peikoff (2003). Rational Action Entails Rational Desire: A Critical Review of Searle's Rationality in Action. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):124 – 138.
Keith E. Stanovich (2012). Why Humans Are (Sometimes) Less Rational Than Other Animals: Cognitive Complexity and the Axioms of Rational Choice. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (1):1 - 26.
Stuart Rachels (2009). On Three Alleged Theories of Rational Behavior. Utilitas 21 (4):506-520.
John A. Lambie (2009). Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge. Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.
Douglas Frye & Philip David Zelazo (1998). Complexity: From Formal Analysis to Final Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):836-837.
Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
Donald Gillies (2005). An Action-Related Theory of Causality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):823-842.
Peter K. Mcinerney (2006). Pollock on Rational Choice and Trying. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):253 - 261.
Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):9-32.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads5 ( #260,821 of 1,679,297 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #183,420 of 1,679,297 )
How can I increase my downloads?