David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 51 (1):64-78 (1984)
Quine's (1969) proposal that the foundationalist programs in epistemology should be abandoned in favor of a scientific study of how we come to hold our theories about the world is still widely misunderstood. It does not eliminate the possibility of rational adjudication of scientific dispute, nor is it essentially tied to behaviorist approaches in psychology. On the contrary, recent work in psychology and philosophy of science can very naturally be seen as embodying the sort of program envisioned by Quine; now freed of behaviorist strictures, it clearly addresses issues that have been of interest in traditional epistemology. This view is defended with particular attention to Quine's concerns with translation and the related concerns with belief individuation which have inspired critics of recent cognitive psychology
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