Simplifying alethic pluralism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48 (2011)
Abstract
What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth
Keywords Truth  Pluralism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.

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