David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):213-230 (2011)
Advocates of traditional views on truth such as the correspondence and coherence theories converge on two theses about truth: substantivism and monism. According to the former thesis, truth consists in some substantive property or relation F. According to the latter thesis, there is exactly one property or relation (whether substantive or not) in terms of which truth is to be accounted for across all truth-apt domains of discourse. The correspondence theorist thus has it that a proposition is true just in case it corresponds with reality, i.e. just in case a certain substantive relation holds between language and the world. Furthermore, this is so for any truth-apt discourse: whether we are dealing with propositions about mathematics, medium-sized dry goods, or legal matters truth always and everywhere consists in correspondence with reality.1 Recently, resistance to alethic traditionalism has emerged from two camps. The deflationist takes issue with substantivism: there is nothing more to truth than what is captured by instances of the following well-known schema: (T) 〈p〉 is true iff p. 2 According to the deflationist, substantive properties (or relations) such as correspondence and coherence have no role to play in an account of truth. At most, a deﬂationist will allow that all true propositions share a “lightweight” property of falling under the concept of truth. Deﬂationists about truth thus reject the metaphysical project that aims to uncover the deep or substantive nature of truth. Truth, according to the deflationist, is merely a logical device that serves certain functions such as endorsing a proposition and making (potentially infinite) generalizations. For instance, instead of saying that the empty set is a subset of every set and that Bob believes 〈the empty set is a subset of every set〉, the power set of an infinite set is uncountable and Bob believes 〈the power set of an infinite set is uncountable〉, and so on for Bob’s other beliefs about set....
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