Virtue Ethics, the "Analects," and the Problem of Commensurability

Journal of Religious Ethics 29 (1):97 - 125 (2001)
Abstract
In support of the thesis that virtue ethics allows for a more comprehensive and consistent interpretation of the "Analects" than other possible models, the author uses a structural outline of a virtue ethic (derived from Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the Aristotelian tradition) to organize a discussion of the text. The resulting interpretation focuses attention on the religious aspects of Confucianism and accounts for aspects of the text that are otherwise difficult to explain. In addition, the author argues that the structural similarities between the Aristotelian and Confucian conceptions of self-cultivation indicate a dimension of commensurability between the two traditions, despite very real variations in specific content. Finally, the author suggests how crosscultural commensurability, in general, can be understood on a theoretical level
Keywords virtue ethics  Chinese philosophy  comparative ethics  Confucianism  Confucius
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Erin M. Cline (2009). The Way, the Right, and the Good. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (1):107-129.
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