Objective probability theory theory
Synthese 57 (3):387 - 442 (1983)
| Abstract | I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed. | |||||||||
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Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
John Pollock (1992). The Theory of Nomic Probability. Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.
John L. Pollock (1992). The Theory of Nomic Probability. Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.
Jan Von Plato (1982). Probability and Determinism. Philosophy of Science 49 (1):51-66.
László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634.
László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38:626.
László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634.
T. V. Reeves (1988). A Theory of Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):161-182.
Simon Saunders (forthcoming). What is Probability? Arxiv Preprint Quant-Ph/0412194.
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