Objective probability theory theory

Synthese 57 (3):387 - 442 (1983)
I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Niall Shanks (1993). Time and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 24 (2):293 - 302.
    H. Krips (1989). Irreducible Probabilities and Indeterminism. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (2):155 - 172.
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