Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument

Philosophical Studies 154 (2):241 - 250 (2011)
The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider's argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley's argument rests on the same premise as Sider's argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibility of simples. Once you stick it all together, you get an absurd consequence. I then survey the possible lessons we could draw from this, arguing that whichever one you take yields an interesting result
Keywords Vagueness Argument  Mereology  Universalism  Unrestricted mereological composition  Sider  Hawley  Mereological simples
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DOI 10.2307/41487664
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References found in this work BETA
Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). From Nihilism to Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):175 – 191.
Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249.
Ned Markosian (1998). Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):213 – 228.

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