The metaphysics of groups

Philosophical Studies 149 (2):251 - 267 (2010)
Abstract
If you are a realist about groups (e.g. religious institutions, football teams, the Mafia etc.) there are three main theories of what to identify groups with. I offer reasons for thinking that two of those theories (groups as sui generis entities and groups as mereological fusions) fail to meet important desiderata. The third option is to identify groups with sets, which meets all of the desiderata if only we take care over which sets they are identified with. I then canvass some possible objections to that third theory, and explain how to avoid them
Keywords Metaphysics of social science  Sets  Ontology
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1986). In Defence of Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):85 – 88.
Ben Caplan & Carl Matheson (2006). Defending Musical Perdurantism. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (1):59-69.

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Citations of this work BETA
Katherine Ritchie (2013). What Are Groups? Philosophical Studies 166 (2):257-272.
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