David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):21-37 (2005)
We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility we term ‘metaphysical nihilism’. The issue should be important to the genuine modal realist because, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself intuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an argument with pre-theoretically credible premises, namely, the subtraction argument. Given the soundness of the subtraction argument, we show that there are two ways that the genuine modal realist can accommodate metaphysical nihilism: (i) by allowing for worlds containing only spatiotemporal points and (ii) by allowing for a world containing nothing but the null individual. Oon methodological grounds, we argue that the genuine modal realist should reject the former way but embrace the latter way.
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David Efird & Tom Stoneham (2009). Is Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231.
Stig Børsen Hansen (2012). Metaphysical Nihilism and Cosmological Arguments: Some Tractarian Comments. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):223-242.
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