Justifying metaphysical nihilism: A response to Cameron
Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):132-137 (2009)
| Abstract | Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of 'concrete'. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions. | |||||||||
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