Abstract

I begin the account of scientific realism with the intuition that we explain the behavior of an object by saying what it is and that if we can say what an object is we have an explanation of its behavior. The question the scientific realist needs to answer is whether the intuition is limited to cases in which an explanation is given in macroscopic terms or whether it can be justifiably extended to theoretical explanations. To justify extending the intuition to theoretical explanations, I give an account of the relationship between the entities postulated by the theory and the entities whose behavior the theory explains, an account of the criteria by which a theory is evaluated, and I justify these criteria as the right criteria. ;The first alternative view I consider is Ronald Giere's naturalized philosophy of science in which he attempts to reject the traditional, epistemological task of justifying theories. Giere fails to show that the epistemological questions need not be answered; yet from within his view, he is powerless to answer them. ;The second alternative I consider is Bas van Fraassen's scientific antirealism. He claims that the most we are ever entitled to believe is what a theory says about observable phenomena, and that we must remain agnostic about the truth of theoretical statements. I show that this view fails, for the reasons we have for believing what a theory says about observable phenomena are the same reasons we have for believing that the theory is approximately true. The only way van Fraassen can reject a realistic conclusion requires a metaphysical distinction between what is observable and what is not. For this he has been unwilling to argue. ;I conclude that the objections to scientific realism can be met, that there are strong arguments for it, and that the alternatives are found wanting. Scientific realism is, by far, the most persuasive view