Residual asymmetric dualism: A theory of mind-body relations
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (2):113-36 (1992)
Progress in understanding the mind-body problem can be made without attempting to solve it as one unified problem, which it is not. Pepper's "Identity Theory" solution to the problem is now seen as not necessarily clarifying for the question of dualism. Residual asymmetrical dualism is proposed as a theory offering one very good way to think about this set of problems in a variety of modes of inquiry. These include neurophysiological research on the amygdala by LeDoux, research in the phenonenon of hearing and learning while under general anesthetic, Gendlin's methods of focusing upon the body during therapeutic procedures and during creative composition of poetry, and Dewey's position concerning "primary experience" versus a "secondary pseudo-environment" inhabited by the civilized human. Residual asymmetrical dualism is not a value-neutral theory: it is based on a determination that bodily intelligence must ultimately guide mental functioning if survival and well-being are to be secured. It leads to take actions within society to carry out whatever steps are needed to alleviate the mind-body split whenever such a split is harmful to human interaction.
|Keywords||Body Dualism Identity Mind Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Edward W. James (1991). Mind-Body Continuism: Dualities Without Dualism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 233 (4):233-255.
Robert A. Jaeger (1978). Brain/Body Dualism. Philosophical Studies 34 (November):427-435.
R. de Boer (1976). Cartesian Categories in Mind-Body Identity Theories. Philosophical Forum 7 (2):139-58.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist? Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist' ? Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist? - No. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing
Adam Drozdek (1993). Computers and the Mind-Body Problem: On Ontological and Epistemological Dualism. Idealistic Studies 23 (1):39-48.
Dean W. Zimmerman (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist?: Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism. In Michael L. Peterson & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing
Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?