Graduate studies at Western
Noûs 40 (3):495-521 (2006)
|Abstract||Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by its representational content is very attractive. Unfortunately, it is in conflict with some quite robust intuitions about the possibility of phenomenal spectrum inversion without misrepresentation. Faced with such a problem, there are the usual three options: reject intentionalism, discount the intuitions and deny that spectrum inversion without misrepresentation is possible, or find a way to reconcile the two by dissolving the apparent conflict. Sydney Shoemaker's (1994) introduction of appearance properties is a particularly ingenious way of pursuing the third strategy, by maintaining that there is a representational difference between the phenomenally spectrum-inverted subjects.2 In introducing appearance properties, Shoemaker does two things: he identifies a theoretical role for some family of properties to play, and he suggests a family of properties as candidates to play that role. I'll argue that his proposed candidates do not play the role as well as we would like, suggest some new candidates, and argue that they do a better job.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Warren Shrader (2010). Shoemaker on Emergence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):285 - 300.
Jeff Speaks, A Quick Argument Against Phenomenism, Fregeanism, Appearance Property-Ism and (Maybe) Functionalism About Perceptual Content.
Richard J. Hall (2007). Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223.
Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
Eric Marcus (2006). Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
James John (2010). Against Qualia Theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.
Jeff Speaks (2011). Spectrum Inversion Without a Difference in Representation is Impossible. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.
Michael Watkins (2008). Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the Conceivability of Inverted Spectra. Synthese 160 (2):203-213.
Timm Triplett (2006). Shoemaker on Qualia, Phenomenal Properties and Spectrum Inversions. Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads85 ( #10,801 of 739,345 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,544 of 739,345 )
How can I increase my downloads?