Secondary qualities and self-location

Abstract
Colors aren't as real as shapes. Shapes are full?fledged qualities of things in themselves, independent of how they're perceived and by whom. Colors aren't. Colors are merely qualities of things as they are for us, and the colors of things depend on who is perceiving them. When we take the fully objective view of the world, things keep their shapes, but the colors fall away, revealed as the mere artifacts of our own subjective, parochial perspective on the world that they are
Keywords Centered Worlds
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    References found in this work BETA
    Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Andy Egan (2012). Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.

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