David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119 (2006)
Colors aren't as real as shapes. Shapes are full?fledged qualities of things in themselves, independent of how they're perceived and by whom. Colors aren't. Colors are merely qualities of things as they are for us, and the colors of things depend on who is perceiving them. When we take the fully objective view of the world, things keep their shapes, but the colors fall away, revealed as the mere artifacts of our own subjective, parochial perspective on the world that they are
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Citations of this work BETA
Andy Egan (2006). Appearance Properties? Noûs 40 (3):495-521.
Andy Egan (2009). Billboards, Bombs and Shotgun Weddings. Synthese 166 (2):251 - 279.
Dilip Ninan (2010). De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
Marie Guillot (2013). The Limits of Selflessness: Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of de Se Thoughts. Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.
Andy Egan (2012). Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.
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