What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mind

Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74 (1989)
Stephen Stich has argued that psychological theories that instantiate his Syntactic Theory of Mind are to be preferred to content-based or representationalist theories, because the former can capture and explain a wider range of generalizations about cognitive processes than the latter. Stich's claims about the relative merits of the Syntactic Theory of Mind are unfounded. Not only is it false that syntactic theories can capture psychological generalizations that content-based theories cannot, but a large class of behavioral regularities, readily explained by content-based theories, appear to be beyond their explanatory reach
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind  Psychology  Syntactics
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DOI 10.1086/289519
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