David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):377-377 (1999)
Pylyshyn's argument is very similar to one made in the 1960s to the effect that vision may be influenced by spatial selective attention being directed to distinctive stimulus features, but not by mental set for meaning or membership in an ill-defined category. More recent work points to a special role for spatial attention in determining the contents of perception.
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