The ineffable and the incalculable: G. E. Moore on moral expertise
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
According to G. E. Moore, moral expertise requires abilities of several kinds: the ability to factor judgments of right and wrong into (a) judgments of good and bad and (b) judgments of cause and effect, (2) the ability to use intuition to make the requisite judgments of good and bad, and (3) the ability to use empirical investigation to make the requisite judgments of cause and effect. Moore’s conception of moral expertise is thus extremely demanding, but he supplements it with some very simple practical guidance.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Cowley (2011). Expertise, Wisdom and Moral Philosophers: A Response to Gesang. Bioethics 26 (6):337-342.
Zoltan P. Majdik & William M. Keith (2011). Expertise as Argument: Authority, Democracy, and Problem-Solving. [REVIEW] Argumentation 25 (3):371-384.
Chengping Zhang (2010). Moral Luck in Thomas Hardy's Fiction. Philosophy and Literature 34 (1):pp. 82-94.
Jack Temkin (1984). Singer, Moore, and the Metaphysics of Morals. Philosophy Research Archives 10:567-571.
Michael Cholbi (2007). Moral Expertise and the Credentials Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):323-334.
David Archard (2011). Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts. Bioethics 25 (3):119-127.
Michael Cholbi (2009). Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.
Harry Collins & Martin Weinel (2011). Transmuted Expertise: How Technical Non-Experts Can Assess Experts and Expertise. [REVIEW] Argumentation 25 (3):401-413.
Julia Driver (2006). Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):619 - 644.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads7 ( #198,193 of 1,139,979 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?