Qualitative Judgments, Quantitative Judgments, and Norm-Sensitivity

Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):335-336 (2010)
Abstract
Moral considerations and our normative expectations influence not only our judgments about intentional action or causation but also our judgments about exact probabilities and quantities. Whereas those cases support the competence theory proposed by Knobe in his paper, they remain compatible with a modular conception of the interaction between moral and nonmoral cognitive faculties in each of those domains.
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