David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Journal of Law in Context 7:209-232 (2011)
I argue that law is not best considered an essentially contested concept. After first explaining the notion of essential contestability and disaggregating the concept of law into several related concepts, I show that the most basic and general concept of law does not fit within the criteria generally offered for essential contestation. I then buttress this claim with the additional explanation that essential contestation is itself a framework for understanding complex concepts and therefore should only be applied when it is useful to gain a greater understanding of uses of the concept to which it is applied (adducing criteria for making such judgments of usefulness). With that in mind, I then show that applying the appellation of essential contestation to the concept of law does not helpfully illuminate the most general concept of law (usually of most interest to legal philosophers) and therefore it should not be used, while allowing that it might be more useful for the related concept of the rule of law.
|Keywords||Essentially contested concepts legal interpretivism methodology of jurisprudence|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Samantha Miles (2012). Stakeholder: Essentially Contested or Just Confused? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 108 (3):285-298.
Andrew Mason (1990). On Explaining Political Disagreement: The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept. Inquiry 33 (1):81 – 98.
Adaeze Okoye (2009). Theorising Corporate Social Responsibility as an Essentially Contested Concept: Is a Definition Necessary? [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 89 (4):613 - 627.
J. Waldron (2002). Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)? Law and Philosophy 21 (2):137-164.
Eric Reitan (2001). Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept. Hypatia 16 (2):43-66.
Paula Gaido (2011). The Purpose of Legal Theory: Some Problems with Joseph Raz's View. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 30 (6):685-698.
Jules L. Coleman (ed.) (2001). Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law. Oxford University Press.
Frederick Schauer (2010). Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law. Ratio Juris 23 (1):1-21.
Henrique Schneider (2008). Legalism as Legal Positivism? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 40:163-168.
Francois Chevrette & Hugo Cyr, Legal Positivism? What Are You Talking About? ('De Quel Positivisme Parlez-Vous?').
William L. Twining (2009). General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law From a Global Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
Jos Lehmann, Joost Breuker & Bob Brouwer (2004). Causation in AI and Law. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (4):279-315.
Robert Alexy (2002). The Argument From Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism. Oxford University Press.
Siegfried Van Duffel (2007). Sovereignty as a Religious Concept. The Monist 90 (1):126-143.
Added to index2011-01-28
Total downloads464 ( #2,297 of 1,793,000 )
Recent downloads (6 months)203 ( #795 of 1,793,000 )
How can I increase my downloads?