David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):443 – 463 (2004)
'Natural class' trope nominalism makes a trope's being of a certain sort--its nature--a matter of its membership in a certain natural class of actual tropes. It has been objected that on this theory had even a single member of the class of red tropes not existed, for example, then the type 'being red' would not have been instantiated and nothing would have been red. I argue that natural class trope nominalism can avoid this implication by way of counterpart theory as applied to properties.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sam Cowling (2015). Non-Qualitative Properties. Erkenntnis 80 (2):275-301.
Sophie Gibb (2007). Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent? Dialectica 61 (4):539-558.
Kris McDaniel (2006). Modal Realisms. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):303–331.
Similar books and articles
H. E. Baber (1987). How Bad Is Rape? Hypatia 2 (2):125 - 138.
P. X. Monaghan (2010). A Novel Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms. Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
Bence Nanay (2010). Population Thinking as Trope Nominalism. Synthese 177 (1):91 - 109.
David Manley (2002). Properties and Resemblance Classes. Noûs 36 (1):75–96.
S. C. Gibb (2004). The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.
Michael Tooley (ed.) (1999). The Nature of Properties: Nominalism, Realism, and Trope Theory. Garland Pub..
Douglas Ehring (2002). The Causal Argument Against Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):179 - 190.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #64,586 of 1,725,471 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #211,098 of 1,725,471 )
How can I increase my downloads?